The private signing state changes
In a stateful hash-based signature system, the signer has a finite supply of one-time signing keys organized within a larger structure. Signing consumes an available position and advances the private state. The long-lived public key can verify many signatures, but each relevant one-time signing key must obey its usage restriction.
XMSS and LMS are important examples. They should not be operated as if a private key were an endlessly reusable, unchanged file. Their designs require the signer to know which signing state has already been consumed, including across recovery and failure events.
Sources:RFC 8391: XMSSRFC 8554: Leighton-Micali hash-based signatures
Reuse can invalidate the security argument
Signing different messages with the same one-time state can expose information that enables forgery. This is an ordinary operational failure with cryptographic consequences; an attacker does not need a quantum computer for the problem to matter. A recognizable PQC algorithm name therefore does not compensate for broken state handling.
The relevant unit is a signing operation, not merely a confirmed payment. A transaction that is signed but never confirmed may still have exposed a signature to another system or person. Safe state consumption must be designed around what the signing process released, rather than assuming the chain alone records every use.
Sources:RFC 8391: XMSS
Recovery must preserve history
Consider a backup made before several signatures were generated. Restoring that backup can restore an old counter as well as the key material. If the recovered signer trusts the old state, it may repeat positions used after the backup. Copying one wallet to two active devices can create a related coordination problem.
This example is a reason to examine the documented wallet recovery procedure, not a universal set of instructions for all wallets. The implementation must account for durable updates, failures, synchronization and the possibility of signatures that never reached the blockchain. A user should follow the specific wallet documentation and understand its guarantees.
Sources:RFC 8391: XMSSRFC 8554: Leighton-Micali hash-based signatures
Stateless addresses one particular burden
SLH-DSA is a stateless hash-based signature scheme. It does not require the application to maintain the same consumable one-time index discipline as XMSS. This changes the operational tradeoff, but does not eliminate the need to protect key material, generate keys correctly and implement the scheme securely.
Choosing between constructions also involves signature size, signing and verification work, storage and protocol support. A simpler recovery model can be valuable, while increased transaction data can create other costs. These are system-level tradeoffs and should be evaluated with the actual parameter set and target environment.
Sources:NIST FIPS 205: SLH-DSANIST SP 800-208: Stateful hash-based signatures
Questions for a wallet or chain profile
For a project using stateful signatures, identify the exact scheme and the mechanism that reserves signing positions. Ask how the signer recovers after interruption, how multiple devices are handled and what happens when the available signature capacity is exhausted. Look for documented behavior and implementation evidence.
NIST SP 800-208 recommends specified stateful schemes subject to restrictions; that recommendation is not a certification of a cryptocurrency wallet. A useful project profile consequently records both the mathematical construction and unresolved operational questions. The presence of XMSS support alone cannot establish that a particular backup or deployment has been assessed.