Signatures answer an authorization question

A signature scheme has key-generation, signing and verification procedures. A verifier checks a message, a signature and a public key together. In a cryptocurrency, the protocol determines how that check contributes to spending permission. Signature verification alone does not decide balances, transaction order or every other consensus condition.

The signed message need not be secret. A publicly visible transaction can be signed so that others can check its authorization. The validity of the signature also does not guarantee that a human understood the transaction or intended the outcome of a malicious wallet interface.

Sources:NIST FIPS 204: ML-DSABitcoin developer guide: transactions

KEMs establish secret material

A key-encapsulation mechanism lets participants establish a shared secret under specified conditions. One side encapsulates using an encapsulation public key and obtains both a ciphertext and a secret. The holder of the corresponding decapsulation private key uses that ciphertext to recover the secret. A larger protocol then uses suitable key derivation and symmetric cryptography.

This is not a transaction-signing operation. It also does not automatically authenticate the identity of the other participant: the surrounding protocol must address public-key authenticity and active attackers. ML-KEM support is meaningful evidence about key establishment, not evidence that a network has changed its spending signatures.

Sources:NIST FIPS 203: ML-KEMNIST SP 800-227: Recommendations for KEMs

Hashes are reusable building blocks

A cryptographic hash maps an input to a fixed-length digest. Protocols use hashes in many places, including transaction identifiers, commitments, tree structures and signature constructions. A digest is not a private key and does not, on its own, authenticate who produced a message.

Hash-based signatures combine hash functions with carefully specified key generation, message processing and authentication structures. XMSS and SLH-DSA are examples with different operational requirements. Saying a chain uses a strong hash does not establish that all its signatures are hash-based or that its complete protocol has been reviewed.

Sources:RFC 8391: XMSSNIST FIPS 205: SLH-DSA

A system can need all three

Imagine a wallet retrieving information over an encrypted connection, constructing a transfer and signing it locally. Key establishment can help protect the connection. A signature can authorize the transfer. Hashing may identify transaction data or connect it to other records. Improving one operation leaves the others as separate engineering responsibilities.

The same distinction applies to a node operator. Transport encryption, block validation and release authenticity can use different cryptographic libraries and keys. A useful inventory records the function, algorithm, owner and dependencies for each use, rather than assigning one cryptographic label to the entire application.

Sources:NCCoE migration project: discovery and inventory

Read a claim as a specific substitution

When a project announces PQC support, translate the announcement into a concrete statement. Which old operation is replaced? Which new algorithm and parameter set are used? Which software version enables it? Does using the feature change transaction validity, or only communication with a server?

This approach also makes comparisons fairer. Compare signatures with signatures at an identified parameter set and implementation context. Compare KEMs for a key-establishment requirement. Keep broader questions, such as wallet recovery, consensus and deployment, alongside those primitive-level comparisons so that a good algorithm result is not mistaken for a completed migration.

Sources:NCCoE migration project: discovery and inventoryNIST IR 8547: Transition to PQC standards